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1. Introduction 
 
Removals of non-citizens have become part of the standard migration policy in many Western 
democracies since the 1990s. Migration researchers refer to the development of growing deportation 
numbers as ‘deportation turn’ (Gibney, 2008: 146; Paoletti, 2010: 4). Even though deportations are a 
socially coercive state measure (Ellermann, 2009) and constrain personal freedoms in a significant 
manner, public debate over the deportation regime (De Genova, 2010) and political control of 
implementation procedures have for a long time been insufficient. Forcible removals of non-citizens 
are carried out under a veil of secrecy. Only occasionally do individual cases attract media attention 
and consequently political interest. 
Within academia, the deportation regime has become a topic of interest since the turn of the 
century. Two major bodies of literature have been developed. The first addresses the issue of 
deportation from a human rights perspective. The immanent violence to removals which has become 
more obvious with the deportation turn (Ellermann, 2009; Fekete, 2003, 2011; De Genova, 2002, 
2010), is criticized. Thus, the sociologist Liza Schuster (2004) draws the conclusion that, since it is 
impossible to enforce removals without violating human rights, they should be abolished. Another line 
of research – mostly originating in political science - analyses the (symbolic) significance of 
deportation for nation state sovereignty (Gibney and Hansen, 2003; Gibney, 2008). From this 
perspective, human rights, inasmuch as they represent an obstacle to the implementation of 
deportations, pose a challenge for nation state sovereignty (Castles, 2004). Rather recent studies on the 
deportation gap (Gibney, 2008: 149), which indicate a considerable discrepancy between the number 
   
of removable persons and the number of persons actually removed in various western countries 
(Paoletti, 2010; Ellermann, 2009), substantiate this thesis empirically. 
Political control exercised by members of parliaments on the one hand and accountability by 
government actors on the other, are seen as constitutive of liberal democracies. Considering the 
sensitivity of deportations from a human rights perspective, it is surprising that political oversight and 
accountability have hardly been dealt with by deportation researchers so far. As Virginie Guiraudon 
and Gallya Lahav have noted, the accountability of migration policy is increasingly frustrated by 
means of shifting responsibilities ‘upward to intergovernmental fora (…), downward to local 
authorities (…), and outward to nonstate actors’ (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000: 164). As a consequence, 
administrative processes become less transparent and often go un-controlled. As an example of an 
upwardly shifted responsibility, Johannes Pollak and Peter Slominski investigated the European border 
control agency Frontex, pointing to gross accountability deficits due to a diffuse legal mandate and 
insufficient political and independent control mechanisms (Pollak and Slominski, 2009: 917–920). 
Studies on the outward responsibility shifts from state to private actors have arrived at similar 
conclusions regarding the diffuse distribution of tasks and accountabilities (Bacon, 2005: 21–24). 
Research on state monitoring systems, which are provided for in the EC Return Directive 
2008/115/EC, differentiates between the removal procedure carried out by national police forces and 
the post-deportation phase in the receiving country. Whilst the monitoring of removal procedures is 
institutionalized in many countries (Röthlisberger, 2014), most EU Member States have failed to 
install post-deportation monitoring systems. NGOs and international organizations are able to 
compensate for this institutional deficit only to a certain extent (Schuster and Majidi, 2013: 222). So 
far, only political scientist Antje Ellermann (2009: 89-120) has carried out research on parliamentary 
oversight of removals and its consequences for administrative action, using Germany and the United 
States as cases.  
This article follows on from these studies and aims at contributing to the political - more 
specifically, parliamentary - control of deportation-related issues. Taking the case of Austria, the data 
is composed of 183 written questions, submitted by parliamentarians in two legislative periods (LPs). 
Based on these questions, we analysed the frequency and content of deportation control and how they 
have changed over time. Secondly, we interpreted the changes taking inner-parliamentary, as well as 
   
extra-parliamentary, developments into account. Our guiding questions were: How are control 
activities changing over time and why? What motivates certain members of parliament (MPs) to 
submit parliamentary questions: Is it human rights concerns linked to growing deportation numbers 
and the deportation turn; or enforcement deficits, expressed in the deportation gap? The essay shows, 
that the use of the parliamentary control instrument is intensified and reflects a greater visibility of 
deportations in public discourse and furthermore, it takes part in shaping the discourse itself. Yet, and 
in contrast to what the scientific literature suggests, in our case the growing frequency of 
parliamentary oversight does not result in a strengthening of fundamental rights. Quite the contrary: 
Over time, the inquiries shift away from being concerned with human rights and dignity in 
enforcement procedures to being concerned with failed enforcement. We interpret these findings with 
the changed composition of the federal government and, hence, changed composition of parliamentary 
opposition (inner-parliamentary developments) and growing public interest in deportation (extra-
parliamentary developments).  
 
2. From the deportation turn to the deportation gap 
In Austria, we distinguish three procedures by which non-citizens are deported under use or threat of 
force: Removals, Dublin-transfers and mandatory returns. A removal is the coercive enforcement of an 
expulsion order. It may affect undocumented migrants but also asylum seekers whose application has 
been rejected. Dublin-transfers apply exclusively to asylum seekers. The Dublin-II Directive 
2003/343/EC1 provides that states can reject and transfer asylum-seekers who have stayed in or 
travelled through other Member States. The term mandatory return (Dünnwald, 2012: 181) is used for 
non-citizens who depart a state’s territory as the result of an expulsion order. Such departures are often 
referred to as voluntary or documented returns, expressions which obscure their inherent coercive 
character: If a person fails to leave within a set timeframe, the alien police are authorized to resort to 
forcible measures (Slominski and Trauner, 2014: 160).  
For our empirical study, we have analysed parliamentary questions on all three coercive 
measures.  
                                                 
1 The recent Dublin-III Directive 604/2013/EU brought about only minor changes (Slominski and Trauner, 
2014: 160). 
 
   
In the 1990s, removal numbers increased significantly in Austria like in other European 
countries. From 1995 onwards, over 10,000 removal orders were enforced each year (Welz, 2014: 5). 
Since the turn of the century though, numbers have been dropping. This development can in part be 
explained by the growing importance of Dublin-transfers and documented returns; the latter has 
become the most frequent among the three measures since 2008. Another statistical development 
worth noting is the deportation gap, which has stabilized as a relevant factor in this same time period.  
Which groups of non-citizens in Austria are targeted, by what extent and by which way? The 
figures in table 1 show that migrants are affected more frequently by removals than rejected asylum 
seekers. However, when also considering Dublin-transfers, which are only applied against asylum 
seekers, we can see that both groups are equally subjected to deportations in the years from 2008 to 
2012. Numbers on mandatory returns are incorporated in documented returns which do not 
differentiate between asylum seekers and non-asylum seekers. However, according to the Ministry of 
the Interior, in the years from 2005 to 2009, between 72 and 100 per cent of all returnees had applied 
for asylum at one point during their stay in Austria (BMI, 2010: 43).  
 The fact that an expulsion order does not necessarily end in a deportation, is expressed by the 
factor deportation gap. Deducting enforced removals and documented returns from the total number 
of expulsion orders, reveals that 51 to 77 per cent have not been enforced between 2002 and 2013 (see 
table 2).   
 
3. The control instrument: Written parliamentary questions 
Austrian MPs have three instruments available to control administrative activities relating to 
deportations: The right of inquiry, resolutions and questions (written, oral and urgent questions). Since 
the right of inquiry and the adoption of a resolution require a parliamentary majority decision and the 
Austrian government can usually rely on the support of this majority, these two control instruments are 
hardly used (Fallend, 2000: 179).2 In contrast, questions are a parliamentary minority right. They can 
be used by individuals (oral questions) or a number of five MPs (written and urgent questions).  
 Written questions make executive procedures the subject of oversight and thereby of political 
                                                 
2  This shortcoming became obvious when all four applications to initiate an inquiry into the death of a 
deportee during a flight was rejected by the parliamentary majority in the XXnd legislative period. 
   
contestation. They are directed at the government or members of the government and require an 
answer within a given timeframe. The political strength of the instrument lies in the fact that it makes 
administrative procedures more transparent and holds the competent members of the government 
accountable (Siefken, 2010; Fallend, 2000; Nödl, 1995). They may not only control government 
actions ex-post, but also ex-ante by making hitherto ignored issues an object of political debate and 
initiate deliberation over alternative policy positions. In these cases, parliamentary questions are used 
for agenda-setting (Page, 2006) or influencing future executive performance by anticipating oversight 
(Patzelt, 2013: 25).  
 
4. Material and method  
The Austrian case is especially compelling for a study on political control of the deportation regime, 
since – even though migration is a longstanding topic for inter-party contest – the deportation issue has 
long been marginalized. Phenomena like the deportation turn and the deportation gap thus went 
widely unchallenged. Our research period comprises two legislative periods (XXIInd LP, December 
2002 to October 2006; XXIVth LP, October 2008 to October 2013). We chose these periods in order to 
investigate different constellations of government and opposition (Sánchez de Dios and Wiberg, 2011: 
357-358). From 2002 to 2005, a coalition government of the Austrian People’s Party (Österreichische 
Volkspartei, ÖVP) and the Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) was in power. 
Following intra-party conflicts, the Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreichs, 
BZÖ) separated from the FPÖ and governed from April 2005 to the end of the legislative period. From 
2008 to 2013, a coalition of the Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, SPÖ) and 
the People’s Party (ÖVP) was running the government.  
 A total of 15 resolutions, four urgent, three oral and 183 written questions regarding 
deportations were submitted in these two periods. Written questions are thus the instrument most 
frequently used to supervise deportation procedures.3 The findings presented below are based on these 
183 written parliamentary questions. We accessed all potentially relevant questions via the website of 
                                                 
3 A list with links to these 183 written interpellations can be found here: 
http://inex.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/ag_divpol/Liste-Schriftliche-Parlamentarische-Anfragen-
XXII-und-XXIV-140514.pdf 
   
the parliament4 by using key terms. We systematized the data in a way to see how often each political 
party used the instrument in the different time periods and which of the coercive measures and 
residence status groups were made an issue of inquiry. Following that, we carried out a content 
analysis (Früh 2004) in order to find out, whether the questions dealt with enforcement, non-
enforcement or the post-deportation phase and from a liberal or restrictive migration policy position.  
 
5. Control activity is rising 
Table 3 summarizes the frequency of questions per political party in the two legislative periods. It 
indicates an increasing frequency of parliamentary questions from one period to the next for all 
parties:5 The Greens, acting as an opposition party in both periods, triple their number of questions; as 
does the SPÖ, although moving from opposition to government. For the FPÖ, a 24-fold increase is 
noted. The individual parties’ share in the questions is thus reversed: While the Greens account for 50 
per cent of all questions in the first period and 19 per cent in the second, the FPÖ accounts for 18 per 
cent in the first and 58 per cent in the second period. In comparison, the SPÖ’s share decreases from 
32 to 12 per cent and the BZÖ, which only becomes active in the second phase of investigation, 
accounts for 11 per cent of the questions.6 Thus, the FPÖ evolves as the party with the fewest to the 
party with the most questions. Together with the other anti-migration party BZÖ, they are responsible 
for two thirds of the questions. 
 Which of the measures (removals, Dublin-transfers or documented returns) and which 
residence status groups (asylum seekers or non-asylum seekers) are mentioned in the inquiries and 
how does this correlate with actual deportation numbers? Figure 1 underlines a dominant interest of 
the MPs for removals. This interest is growing, even though the number of actual removals has 
decreased, Dublin-transfers show a different picture: While in the earlier period, they are questioned in 
                                                 
4  Accessible at: http://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/JMAB/. 
5  Taking into account the different lengths of the LPs, the overall increase per year is fourfold. Relative to 
the total of written interpellations, the share of deportation-related questions rise from 0.4 to 1 per cent. 
6 ÖVP and Team Stronach did not submit any question to the government. Team Stronach acquired the club 
status in September 2012, one year before the end of the XXIVth LP. The ÖVP has been a governing party 
since 1987 and in charge of the Ministry of the Interior since March 2000. 
   
a disproportionately high number of cases (they account for six per cent of all deportations,7 at the 
same time 45 per cent of the questions relate to them), in the later period, the share of references to 
Dublin-transfers in questions settles at about their share in actual deportations. A significant 
discrepancy can be observed for documented returns: They are only mentioned in five per cent of the 
questions in each period, whilst their percentage increases from 20 to 51 per cent of all deportations. 
Asylum seekers are far more often the object of inquiries than non-asylum seekers, even 
though they are less affected by deportations: Over the research periods, 60 per cent of all deportations 
were carried out on illegal migrants and 40 per cent on asylum seekers.8 While asylum seekers are 
mentioned in 42 per cent of the questions, non-asylum seekers in only two per cent. This suggests that 
the topic of asylum is discursively linked to the topic of deportation (see figure 2).  
 
6. Control topics and political positioning 
Our content analysis indicates which phases of the deportation process are queried in the two research 
periods and from which migration policy perspective (see table 4). 
 In the following, we will discuss the findings on the control of the executive processes of 
deportation along the two dominant theoretical perspectives: 1) The perspective inspired by a liberal 
migration policy and the protection of human rights and 2) the perspective inspired by a restrictive 
migration policy and the safeguarding of state sovereignty. 
6.1. Liberal perspective: Human rights 
Scientific studies, which analyse deportation from a human rights perspective often refer to the 
international legal order and human rights conventions (Fekete, 2003, 2011; Welz and Winkler, 2014). 
Some researchers also point to non-codified universal rights such as the freedom of movement or the 
free choice of place of residence (De Genova, 2002, 2010). 
In the given area of parliamentary control, the human rights perspective was strong in the 
period between 2002 and 2006. The parliamentary questions refer to the sensitive aspects of the 
implementation process, exercise criticism against individual deportations and put the lack of 
                                                 
7  Figures relating to Dublin-transfers have only been available since 2004. The 6 per cent relate to the 
years from 2004 to 2006.  
8  Removals plus Dublin-transfers. 
   
accountability for the post-deportation phase on the agenda. The dominance of the human rights 
oriented debate is attributed to the fact that 80 per cent of the questions were originating from the 
Greens and the Social Democrats, who were forming a liberal alliance against the centre-right 
government and its restrictive political stance on immigration.  
In the XXIVth LP the Greens continue to discuss deportation-related issues from this 
perspective, but are only partly backed by the Social Democrats who now form a coalition government 
with the Austrian People’s Party. Since this phase, the anti-migration parties FPÖ and BZÖ are leading 
the parliamentary inquiries on deportations, consequently, the human rights orientation has vanished 
even further from the agenda.  
Below, we will briefly discuss which implementation stages are problematized from the liberal 
perspective and which topics and arguments are used. Questions concerning the enforcement of 
deportation strategically place individual cases at the centre of the inquiries and try to meticulously 
reconstruct the respective deportation incidents and possible rights violations committed by the 
involved authorities (the Greens, 8290/J). What makes the control of the implementation process 
necessary in the eyes of the MPs, is the importance of respecting/complying with international law and 
human rights. ‘Liberal’ questions in the category of non-enforcement not only draw on international 
conventions, but more comprehensive ideas of justice and ‘deservingness’ (Paoletti, 2010: 19). They 
are aimed at stopping deportations in individual cases or when applied against specific groups. 
However, deportations are rated as morally problematic above all when vulnerable groups are 
concerned, like people suffering from medical conditions or families with children. For instance, in a 
question headed ‘Deportation offensive against families by federal government’ (the Greens, 1928/J), 
the MPs accused the government of making families a primary target for deportations. In the period 
between 2008 and 2013, the argument of 'successful integration' (the Greens 6978/J; 4186/J) was 
added to the argument of moral deservingness. In this vein, the expulsion order against an ‘exemplar 
of an integrated asylum seeker’ (the Greens 2562/J) was criticized in place of all other ‘persons 
integrated since several years’. The critique built on the argument that people, who have successfully 
integrated into society and/or the labour market, deserve to stay in Austria.  
   
Again referring to individual deportation cases, with regard to the post-deportation phase, it is 
requested that Austrian authorities must ensure the protection of rights of removed persons in the 
receiving countries (the Greens 2110/J; 5314/J; SPÖ 1334/J). In this example, the question refers to 
the Dublin-transfer of a person suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder: The MPs sought to find 
out how the authorities would ensure, ‘that the necessary medical treatment is provided for in the 
facility of the receiving country’ (the Greens 4066/J). In the second LP, the post-deportation phase 
slipped away from the interest of the MPs, even though journalists, as well as academics, continued to 
point out shortcomings of the Austrian asylum system, some of which have had fatal consequences for 
the deported (Funk and Stern, 2010: 249; Brickner and Ruep, 2013).  
To sum up, the human rights perspective is dominant in the earlier LP and focuses on certain 
groups among the concerned – mostly vulnerable, but also integrated persons. The questions intend to 
shed some light on potential human rights violations or to achieve a suspension of deportations. In 
accordance with the legal design of the control instrument, the questions focus on executive actions, 
but do not express basic criticism against the coercive state measure as such.  
6.2. Restrictive perspective: Deportation gap  
Within migration research it is acknowledged that deportations are in conflict with human rights, but 
their legitimacy is not always questioned. It has been argued that the deportation of non-citizens is not 
only the right of sovereign states, but is also constitutive of their existence (Gibney and Hansen, 2003; 
Gibney, 2008; Walters, 2002).  
Table 4 reveals that this reasoning, while being marginalized in the earlier LP, frames the 
majority of questions in the latter. It is no longer individuals who are at the centre of the inquiries, but 
deportation statistics, which are requested in order to measure enforcement success or failure. These 
changes in content can be understood in relation to changes within the governmental system, namely 
by the anti-migration parties FPÖ and BZÖ moving from government to opposition. In their role as 
opposition parties, they drop their tactical reluctance and start an intense use of the control instrument 
against the government. From the restrictive perspective, deportations are framed as a necessary 
measure to ensure a functioning migration control policy. The MPs express their wish for a strict 
   
application of deportation legislation and enforcement of removals against all illegally residing non-
citizens. 
How is the restrictive policy narrative composed? The questions regarding enforcement aim at 
gaining information on how many deportations have been effectively enforced within certain time 
periods (FPÖ 11/J; 178/J; SPÖ 1554/J). Here, the MPs also make strategic use of certain groups 
among the deportable population. BZÖ refers in two thirds, FPÖ in almost half of their questions on 
asylum seekers marked as deviant (BZÖ 420/J; FPÖ 890/J). Terms like ‘asylum abuse’ (FPÖ 846/J) or 
‘drug-related crime’ (FPÖ 13408/J) appear in this context. An example of a question repeatedly asked 
by the BZÖ is the following: ‘How many asylum seekers were reported for which number of crimes in 
the years 2007 and 2008? (...) How many of these asylum seekers have been removed so far?’ (420/J). 
Control of non-enforcement deals with a large range of processes which prevent or slow down 
removals and Dublin-transfers. They range from anti-deportation protests and resistance to being unfit 
for transportation or lacking readmission agreements with the receiving countries (FPÖ 5296/J; 178/J; 
810/J; BZÖ 3901/J). The intention is to gather information on scale, reasons and/or costs for failed 
deportations. In some cases, enforcement is even encouraged. In an inquiry concerning the suspended 
deportation of an Armenian mother and daughter, the MPs sought to know when the deportation would 
eventually be carried through (FPÖ 6667/J). Readmission agreements are not only a topic for FPÖ and 
BZÖ, but also SPÖ. In a question, Social Democrats underlined the necessity to ‘lift the topic over the 
threshold of society’s perception’ since ‘all the tailor-made adaptations of the national immigration act 
are useless if one fails to deal with the possibility of returning immigrants to their respective home 
countries by providing for existing bilateral or European agreements’ (12927/J).  
In conclusion/in summary, we want to point out, that the increase of questions on 
deportation-related topics can be traced back to the concern that not enough deportations are 
implemented. A shift in focus from individuals to numbers can be observed; references to individuals 
or groups are merely made in order to further stress the importance of strict enforcement. The 
restrictive questions carry the message that the removal policy, perceived as failed, should be 
restored.  
 
   
7. Interpretation: Parties and protests 
Our empirical findings indicate that control activity is rising, but changes from being concerned with 
improving the respect for fundamental rights and human dignity to being concerned with improving 
enforcement. How can this trend be explained? Deportation figures only partly deliver an explanation 
for the intensified use of the instrument and the altered policy orientation of the questions. At least, the 
assumption that the more removals there are, the more parliamentary questions there are proved 
wrong. Rather, it is the falling deportation numbers, which are the catalysts for the intensified inquiries 
from a restrictive perspective – as indicated by the control of non-enforcement. But since the number 
of removals had already begun to fall at the beginning of this century and the deportation gap grew 
only slightly, we have to discuss alternative explanations. These can be found in the composition of 
government and opposition and growing awareness and visibility of deportation in media and society.  
7.1 Inner-parliamentary developments: Political parties 
The time period in which the questions were submitted was characterized by a political climate 
dominated by critical or even hostile positions regarding migration and asylum. This is reflected in the 
ongoing campaign by the FPÖ against migration since the 1980s. The Freedom Party managed to 
employ anti-migration slogans successfully in election campaigns and to influence migration policy in 
their aftermath decisively. The long-standing government parties SPÖ and ÖVP were hesitant to map 
out different policy stances, but instead integrated FPÖ-demands in their legislative and administrative 
activities. Only the Greens are discussing migration and integration from the perspective of 
opportunities and human rights, however, with lessening intensity over time (Meyer and Rosenberger, 
forthcoming).  
In the XXIInd LP, the opposition parties Greens and SPÖ dominated the parliamentary arena. 
The control activities were modest, but leant towards a human rights perspective. The radical right 
FPÖ merely hinted at their control interest in enforcement rates, but restrained from intensively 
problematizing falling deportation numbers when in government. In the XXIVth LP the governmental 
situation was different. The populist parties changed into opposition parties and used the instrument of 
the parliamentary question to the Ministry of Interior intensively. Consistently, they inquired about 
failed removals and Dublin-transfers and by doing so attacked the performance of the government in 
   
implementing Austria’s migration control policy. In other words: The deportation gap has become a 
hot topic in the parliamentary arena and has been made a topic for confrontation between the 
opposition and the government. Thus, it can be observed for Austria what Gibney (2008: 154) has 
called ‘politics of the deportation gap’ – a political controversy about a topic, which is not only about 
the individuals concerned but also about ideologies, like national sovereignty.  
The amplified control activity of the right-wing opposition parties carries along an increased 
migration political polarization at the margins of the left-right spectre. Deportations are negotiated in 
the discursive field of migration and asylum, the long-standing polarization between left and right on 
these broader issues super-imposes the aspect of deportations. As regards content, this polarization 
represents a case of ‘protection from foreigners’ (FPÖ and BZÖ) on the one hand, and ‘protection of 
foreigners’ (the Greens) on the other. Interestingly, the SPÖ holds an ambivalent position: In cases of 
hardship it stands with the individuals concerned, but at the same time pushes for a removal of 
deportation-challenges. 
7.2 Extra-parliamentary developments: Civil society and media 
The increase in parliamentary questions is not only a result of the dynamics of government and 
opposition but has been embedded in a changing societal sensitivity towards deportations in Austria. 
The increased control activity is thus also to be interpreted as a reaction inside the parliament to 
phenomena taking place outside of parliament. 
Migration has been one of the most politically sensitive issues among the competing parties 
in Austria (Gruber et al., 2012; Gruber, 2010). However, this does not apply to deportation policy and 
enforcement to the same extent. The coercive measures were first broadly and emotionally discussed 
in 1999, when Marcus Omofuma died of suffocation on his deportation flight from Austria (Karner, 
2011: 155). However, the debate was of short duration and only flared up again in 2006/07 when a 
student from Kosovo threatened to commit suicide if her family was removed. Since then, there has 
been a constant stream of media reports about deportation and resistance against individual removals 
(Gruber et. al, 2012; Rosenberger and Winkler, 2014). 
This increased awareness is reflected in the references to media reports made by the Greens. 
In the earlier period statements by human rights organizations or legal experts served as important 
   
reference points, in the latter period these were widely replaced by press articles on deportations. 
Another hint in that direction is that the individual cases mentioned in the questions by the Greens 
often shared the profiles of those individuals who inspired the most anti-deportation protests. 
Vulnerability and deservingness are important factors in this regard.  
Civil society’s outcry against removals also provoked a counter-discourse. As a reaction to 
the growing unease in society, the right-wing parties insisted on the enforcement of deportation laws 
with even greater vigour. FPÖ and BZÖ also referred to protest cases and used them in order to send 
a signal to the government not to bow to the pressure of the protesters. This became obvious in the 
following quote: ‘Will the same approach towards deported families be used this year as with the 
Komani case?’ (FPÖ 6678/J). The removal order of the referenced family had been revoked by the 
Ministry of Interior following protests. 
This evidence allows us to conclude, that the politicization of deportation outside of the 
parliament - in the streets, schools and the media - resonates in parliamentary work. The Greens, as 
well as the FPÖ, refer to them, even though they offer differing interpretations: Indulgence for 
specific cases versus enforcement without exceptions. Put differently: The control interests range 
from respect for human rights to a critique of the deportation gap. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper has investigated 183 parliamentary questions on the matter of deportation in Austria, 
revealing a dynamic area of control which has changed significantly in terms of intensity and content 
over a period of 11 years. The questions give evidence of how and by whom the deportation gap was 
put on the political agenda. The comparative analysis of control intensity, topics and underlying policy 
narratives has brought the following empirical results and analytical findings: 
The number of parliamentary questions regarding removals has increased – albeit from a very low 
level. In the earlier period, deportations were problematized from a human rights perspective, 
prominently by the Greens. As a discursive strategy, reference was made to vulnerable, later also to 
integrated persons. However, over time the inquiries were less from a human rights perspective, and 
more from restrictive ideas towards migration policy; a finding which is in contrast with scientific 
   
literature on migration control and deportation. Political control turned to a stricter enforcement of 
laws regulating border control. Therefore, the deportation gap has been made into a core matter. These 
changes in control contents may be understood by the different composition of government and 
opposition, and also, by increasing public debate and anti-deportation protests. In this sense, the 
parliamentary discourse mirrors inner-parliamentary constellations as well as the politicization of 
deportation in extra-parliamentary sites, more precisely, in society and media. 
 
   
TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Removals, Dublin-transfers and documented returns in Austria between 2002 and 2013 
 
Year 
 
Total removals 
Removals of 
rejected asylum 
seekers  
Removals of non-
asylum seekers 
Dublin- 
transfers 
Documented 
returnse 
2002 6,842 -- -- -- 878f 
2003 4,041a -- -- -- 1.063f 
2004 5,811a -- -- 408d 1,158d 
2005 4,277 462b 3,851 627d 1,406a 
2006 4,090 349b 3,741 109a  2,189a 
2007 2,838 455b 2,383 894a 2,164a 
2008 2,026 330b 1,696 1,345a 2,736a 
2009 2,481 477b 2,004 1,583a 4,088a 
2010 2,577 579a 1,998 1,460a 4,517a 
2011 2,020a 445a 1,575 932a 3,400a 
2012 1,853a 461a 1,392 984a 3,211a 
2013 1,903 194 1.709 1.059 3.512 
 
Own calculation 
-- No data available 
Sources and remarks: All data without superscript letters are taken from BMI download area. a 
Nationalrat 2014. b BMI 2010. c Until 2003, Dublin-transfers were counted as removals. d BMI 2012. e 
2000-2003: Data only include returnees who took part in IOM Vienna’s Assisted Voluntary Return 
Project. f EMN 2006.
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Table 2: Deportation gap in Austria between 2002 and 2013 
 
 
Year 
Expulsion orders 
 
Removals and 
documented 
returns 
Deportation 
gap  
2002 23,705 7,720 67% 
2003 22,588 5,104 77% 
2004 20,646 6,969 66% 
2005 16,491 5,683 66% 
2006 12,813 6,279 51% 
2007 13,461 5,002 63% 
2008 14,162 4,762 66% 
2009 20,219 6,569 68% 
2010 20,165 7,094 65% 
2011 16,285 5,420 67% 
2012 14,439 5,064 65% 
2013 14,604 5,415 63% 
 
Own calculation based on data from BMI download area, Nationalrat 2014, BMI 2012 and EMN 
2006. 
 
  17 
Table 3: Written parliamentary interpellations on removals, Dublin-transfers and documented 
returns (per legislative period and party) 
 
 
XXIInd 
legislative period 
 
XXIVth 
legislative period 
 
∑ 
 
Party Interpellations Interpellations Interpellations 
 By number In %  By number In %  By number  In % 
Social Democrats 
(SPÖ) 
7 32 19 12  26 14  
People’s Party 
(ÖVP) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 
Freedom Party 
(FPÖ) 
4 18  94 58  98 54  
The Greens (Die 
Grünen) 
11 50  30 19  41 22  
Alliance for the 
Future of Austria 
(BZÖ) 
-- -- 18 11  18 10  
Team Stronach / / -- -- -- -- 
TOTAL 22 100  161 100  183 100  
 
Own calculation 
 
   
Table 4: Inquiries on different phases of the implementation process and political orientation (per 
legislative period) 
 
XXIInd 
legislative period 
XXIVth 
legislative period 
∑ 
 Orientation   Orientation    
Phases of 
implementation process 
Restrictive / 
Sovereignty 
Liberal / 
HR 
∑ Restrictive / 
Sovereignty 
Liberal / 
HR 
∑ ∑ 
Enforcement 31 162 19 861 392 125 144 
Non-Enforcement 33 104 13 733 204 93 106 
Post-deportation phase -- 75 7 -- 35 3 10 
TOTAL ABSOLUTE 6 33 39 159 62 221 2606 
TOTAL RELATIVE 15 85 100 72 28 100 100 
 
Own calculation 
Discussed topics:1 Successful enforcement,2 authorities’ conformity with national laws and human 
rights standards during implementation,3 failed enforcement,4 criticized enforcement,5 responsibilities 
in post-deportation phase. 
Remarks: HR = Human Rights. 6 The discrepancy to the number of interpellations is owed to the fact 
that a single parliamentary interpellation often consists of several questions which may relate to 
different phases of the implementation process. 
 
 
   
Figure 1: Share of removals, Dublin-transfers and documented returns in total of deportations and 
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Own calculation 
Remark: R = Removals, DT = Dublin-transfers, DR = Documented returns. 
   
Figure 2: Share of asylum seekers and non-asylum seekers in deportations and interpellations 
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FIGURE LEGEND 
R = Removals  
DT = Dublin-transfers  
DR = Documented returns  
